Merge pull request #2467 from anthropics/morganl/code-mod-secrets-redaction

code-modernization: never write discovered credential values into findings

plugins/code-modernization/README.md

@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ The commands degrade gracefully, but each of these makes the output meaningfully
 - **The whole system in the tree**: deployment descriptors (JCL, CICS definitions, route configs), copybooks/includes, and DDL/schemas. Entry-point detection and data lineage in `/modernize-map` are guesswork without them.
 - **Production telemetry** (optional): an observability MCP server or batch job logs enable the runtime overlay in `/modernize-assess` and timing annotations on critical paths.
 
+## Secret handling
+
+Legacy systems routinely contain live credentials, and assessment artifacts get committed and shared. **Every agent in this plugin masks credential values** — findings, rule-card parameters, architecture notes, and test fixtures cite `file:line` with a masked preview (`AKIA****`), never the value. When credentials are found, a per-credential inventory (type, location, blast radius, rotation recommendation) is written to `analysis/<system>/SECRETS.local.md`, which the commands gitignore before writing; on non-git projects the quarantine file goes to `~/.modernize/<system>/` instead. `/modernize-harden` splits its remediation diff so credential-removal hunks (which necessarily contain the raw value) land in a gitignored `security_remediation.local.patch`, never the shareable patch. Pass `--show-secrets` to include raw values in the quarantine file (and only there). If you ran an earlier version of this plugin on a real system, check whether `analysis/` artifacts containing credentials were committed or shared, and rotate anything that was.
+
 ## Commands
 
 The commands are designed to be run in order, but each produces a standalone artifact so you can stop, review, and resume.

plugins/code-modernization/agents/architecture-critic.md

@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ For **transformed code**:
 - Does the test suite actually pin behavior, or just exercise code paths?
 - What would the on-call engineer need at 3am that isn't here?
 
+## Secret handling (mandatory)
+
+When a finding quotes code containing a credential, key, token, or
+connection string, mask the value (`'Pr0d****'`) and cite `file:line` —
+findings get appended verbatim to committed notes files.
+
 ## Output
 
 Findings ranked **Blocker / High / Medium / Nit**. Each with: what, where,

plugins/code-modernization/agents/business-rules-extractor.md

@@ -40,6 +40,15 @@ of the technology, skip it.
    from structure/names), **Low** (ambiguous; needs SME).
 6. If confidence < High, write the exact question an SME must answer.
 
+## Secret handling (mandatory)
+
+Rule parameters sometimes *are* credentials — hardcoded passwords in auth
+checks, API keys in partner-service calls, connection strings in batch
+routines. Record the **rule**, never the **value**: write the parameter as
+`<credential — masked, see file:line>` with at most a 2–4 character
+preview. Rule cards flow into briefs and steering decks; a raw credential
+in a parameter list is a leak.
+
 ## Output format
 
 One "Rule Card" per rule (see the format in the `/modernize-extract-rules`

plugins/code-modernization/agents/legacy-analyst.md

@@ -32,6 +32,15 @@ and explain it in terms a modern engineer can act on.
 - **Note what's missing.** Unhandled error paths, TODO comments, commented-out
   blocks, magic numbers — these are signals about history and risk.
 
+## Secret handling (mandatory)
+
+Legacy code is full of live credentials, and your findings get copied into
+shareable reports. When the evidence for a finding — hardcoded config,
+dead code, debt, an interface payload — includes a credential, API key,
+token, connection string, or private key, **never reproduce the value**.
+Cite `file:line` with a masked preview (`VALUE 'Pr0d****'`,
+`password=****`). The finding is the practice, not the value.
+
 ## Output format
 
 Default to structured markdown: tables for inventories, Mermaid for graphs,

plugins/code-modernization/agents/security-auditor.md

@@ -39,7 +39,30 @@ terminal/screen items don't apply to a SPA. Work through what's relevant:
 
 Use available SAST where it helps (npm audit, pip-audit, grep for known-bad
 patterns) but **read the code** — tools miss logic flaws. Show tool output
-verbatim, then add your manual findings.
+verbatim — except secret values, which you redact (see below) — then add
+your manual findings.
+
+## Secret handling (mandatory)
+
+Legacy codebases routinely contain live production credentials, and your
+findings get pasted into decks, tickets, and committed markdown. Copying a
+secret into a report multiplies the exposure you were hired to find.
+
+When you discover a hardcoded credential, API key, token, connection
+string, or private key:
+
+- **Never write the secret's value into any output** — no finding table,
+  no report, no quoted code excerpt, no echoed tool output. Mask it to the
+  first 2–4 identifying characters plus `****` (`AKIA****`,
+  `postgres://app_user:****@db-prod…`). If a scanner prints a secret,
+  redact it before including the excerpt.
+- Cite `file:line`. The source file is the canonical location — anyone who
+  legitimately needs the value can open it there.
+- State what the credential appears to grant access to (database, queue,
+  cloud account, third-party API) and whether it looks like a production
+  or test credential.
+- Recommend rotation for anything that looks live — exposure in source
+  means it is already compromised, independent of any modernization plan.
 
 ## Reporting standard
 

plugins/code-modernization/agents/test-engineer.md

@@ -28,6 +28,15 @@ someone thinks it should do) so that a rewrite can be proven equivalent.
   `@Disabled("pending RULE-NNN")` / `@pytest.mark.skip` / `it.todo()` — never
   deleted.
 
+## Secret handling (mandatory)
+
+Never copy credential-like literals — passwords, API keys, tokens,
+connection strings — from legacy code into test fixtures. Tests live in
+the deliverable codebase and get committed. Substitute clearly-fake values
+of the same shape and length and note the substitution in a comment.
+Anything a test genuinely needs live (e.g. a real database connection for
+a dual-run harness) is read from an environment variable, never inlined.
+
 ## Output
 
 Idiomatic tests for the requested target stack (JUnit 5 / pytest / Vitest /

plugins/code-modernization/commands/modernize-assess.md

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 ---
 description: Full discovery & portfolio analysis of a legacy system — inventory, complexity, debt, effort estimation
-argument-hint: <system-dir> | --portfolio <parent-dir>
+argument-hint: <system-dir> [--show-secrets] | --portfolio <parent-dir>
 ---
 
 **Mode select.** If `$ARGUMENTS` starts with `--portfolio`, run **Portfolio
 mode** against the directory that follows. Otherwise run **Single-system
-mode** against `legacy/$1`.
+mode** against the system dir. Parse flags positionally-independently:
+`--show-secrets` may appear before or after the system dir — the system
+dir is the first non-flag token.
 
 ---
 
@@ -108,12 +110,16 @@ Spawn three subagents **in parallel**:
 2. **legacy-analyst** — "Identify technical debt in legacy/$1: dead code,
    deprecated APIs, copy-paste duplication, god objects/programs, missing
    error handling, hardcoded config. Return the top 10 findings ranked by
-   remediation value, each with file:line evidence."
+   remediation value, each with file:line evidence. If evidence contains a
+   credential value, mask it per your secret-handling rules — never quote
+   it."
 
 3. **security-auditor** — "Scan legacy/$1 for security vulnerabilities:
    injection, auth weaknesses, hardcoded secrets, vulnerable dependencies,
    missing input validation. Return findings in CWE-tagged table form with
-   file:line evidence and severity."
+   file:line evidence and severity. Mask every discovered credential value
+   per your secret-handling rules — file:line plus a 2–4 character masked
+   preview, never the value itself."
 
 Wait for all three. Synthesize their findings.
 
@@ -141,6 +147,31 @@ need explained.
 
 ## Step 6 — Write the assessment
 
+**Secrets quarantine first.** The assessment gets shared and committed —
+discovered credential values must never appear in it. If the
+security-auditor found any hardcoded credentials:
+
+1. Ensure `analysis/.gitignore` exists and contains the lines
+   `SECRETS.local.md` and `*.local.patch` (create or append as needed —
+   the patch pattern is used by `/modernize-harden`; writing both now
+   means the ignore set is complete from first contact). If the project is a
+   git repo, verify with `git check-ignore -q analysis/$1/SECRETS.local.md`
+   — do not write any findings until the check passes. If there is **no
+   git repo** (check for `.svn`/`.hg`/`CVS` too — a `.gitignore` protects
+   nothing under another VCS): refuse `--show-secrets` and write
+   `SECRETS.local.md` to `~/.modernize/$1/` instead of the project tree,
+   telling the user where it went and why.
+2. Write `SECRETS.local.md`: one row per credential — masked preview,
+   `file:line`, credential type, what it grants access to,
+   production/test guess, rotation recommendation. Only if the user passed
+   `--show-secrets`, add the raw value column here — this file only, never
+   ASSESSMENT.md.
+3. Masking applies to **every section of ASSESSMENT.md**, whichever agent
+   produced the finding — the Technical Debt section quotes hardcoded
+   config; those quotes follow the same masking rule as Security Findings.
+   The Security Findings section adds a one-line pointer:
+   "Credential inventory in SECRETS.local.md (gitignored; not for sharing)."
+
 Create `analysis/$1/ASSESSMENT.md` with these sections:
 - **Executive Summary** (3-4 sentences: what it is, how big, how risky, headline recommendation)
 - **System Inventory** (the scc table + tech fingerprint)

plugins/code-modernization/commands/modernize-extract-rules.md

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Merge the three result sets. Deduplicate. For each distinct rule, write a
   When  <trigger>
   Then  <outcome>
   [And  <additional outcome>]
-**Parameters:** <constants, rates, thresholds with their current values>
+**Parameters:** <constants, rates, thresholds with their current values — credentials masked: `<credential — masked, see file:line>`>
 **Edge cases handled:** <list>
 **Suspected defect:** <optional — legacy behavior that looks wrong; decide preserve-vs-fix during transform>
 **Confidence:** High | Medium | Low — <why; if < High, state the exact SME question>

plugins/code-modernization/commands/modernize-harden.md

@@ -1,14 +1,42 @@
 ---
 description: Security vulnerability scan with a reviewable remediation patch — OWASP, CWE, CVE, secrets, injection
-argument-hint: <system-dir>
+argument-hint: <system-dir> [--show-secrets]
 ---
 
-Run a **security hardening pass** on `legacy/$1`: find vulnerabilities, rank
+Run a **security hardening pass** on the legacy system: find
-them, and produce a reviewable patch for the critical ones.
+vulnerabilities, rank them, and produce a reviewable patch for the
+critical ones. Parse arguments flag-independently: the system dir
+(referred to as `$1` below) is the first non-flag token in `$ARGUMENTS`;
+`--show-secrets` may appear anywhere.
 
 This command never edits `legacy/` — it writes findings and a proposed patch
 to `analysis/$1/`. The user reviews and applies (or not).
 
+## Step 0 — Secrets quarantine setup
+
+Findings files get shared, committed, and pasted into decks — discovered
+credential values must never land in them. Before any scanning:
+
+1. Ensure `analysis/.gitignore` exists and contains the lines
+   `SECRETS.local.md` and `*.local.patch`. Create the file or append the
+   missing lines.
+2. If the project is a git repo, verify with
+   `git check-ignore -q analysis/$1/SECRETS.local.md` — if that exits
+   non-zero, fix the ignore rule before proceeding. Do not write any
+   findings until this check passes.
+3. **If there is no git repo** (check for `.svn`/`.hg`/`CVS` too — a
+   `.gitignore` protects nothing under another VCS): refuse
+   `--show-secrets`, and write `SECRETS.local.md` and any `.local.patch`
+   file to `~/.modernize/$1/` instead of the project tree, telling the
+   user where they went and why.
+
+All secret values in every shareable artifact this command produces are
+**masked** (`AKIA****`, `password=****`) and cited by `file:line`. Raw
+values may appear in exactly two places, both gitignored: the
+`*.local.patch` remediation hunks (unavoidably — see Remediate) and, only
+with `--show-secrets`, `SECRETS.local.md`. Never in SECURITY_FINDINGS.md
+or patch commentary.
+
 ## Scan
 
 Spawn the **security-auditor** subagent:
@@ -20,7 +48,9 @@ hardcoded secrets, vulnerable dependency versions, missing input validation,
 path traversal. For each finding return: CWE ID, severity
 (Critical/High/Med/Low), file:line, one-sentence exploit scenario, and
 recommended fix. Run any available SAST tooling (npm audit, pip-audit,
-OWASP dependency-check) and include its raw output."
+OWASP dependency-check) and include its raw output. Mask every discovered
+credential value per your secret-handling rules — file:line plus a 2–4
+character masked preview, never the value itself."
 
 ## Triage
 
@@ -29,26 +59,50 @@ Write `analysis/$1/SECURITY_FINDINGS.md`:
 - Findings table sorted by severity
 - Dependency CVE table (package, installed version, CVE, fixed version)
 
+If any hardcoded credentials were found, also write
+`analysis/$1/SECRETS.local.md` (the gitignored quarantine file from Step 0):
+one row per credential — masked preview, `file:line`, credential type, what
+it appears to grant access to, production/test guess, and a rotation
+recommendation. With `--show-secrets`, append the raw value column here —
+this file only. SECURITY_FINDINGS.md gets a one-line pointer:
+"N hardcoded credentials found — inventory in SECRETS.local.md (gitignored;
+not for sharing)."
+
 ## Remediate
 
 For each **Critical** and **High** finding, draft a minimal, targeted fix.
-Do **not** edit `legacy/` — write all fixes as a single unified diff to
+Do **not** edit `legacy/` — write fixes as unified diffs with **paths
-`analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch`, with a comment line above each
+relative to the project root** (`legacy/$1/...`), applied from the project
-hunk citing the finding ID it addresses (`# SEC-001: parameterize the query`).
+root, with a comment line above each hunk citing the finding ID it
+addresses (`# SEC-001: parameterize the query`).
+
+**Credential findings split into two files.** A diff that removes a
+hardcoded secret necessarily contains the raw value on its `-` and
+context lines — that cannot go in the shareable patch:
+
+- `analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch` (shareable) — every
+  non-credential hunk, plus for each credential finding a comment-only
+  placeholder: `# SEC-NNN: credential remediation — hunk in
+  security_remediation.local.patch (gitignored; not for sharing)`.
+- `analysis/$1/security_remediation.local.patch` (gitignored in Step 0) —
+  the real, applyable hunks for credential findings only.
 
 Add a **Remediation Log** section to SECURITY_FINDINGS.md mapping each
-finding ID → one-line summary of the proposed fix and the patch hunk that
+finding ID → one-line summary of the proposed fix and which patch file
-implements it.
+carries the hunk.
 
 ## Verify
 
-Spawn the **security-auditor** again to **review the patch** against the
+Spawn the **security-auditor** again to **review both patches** against
-original code:
+the original code:
 
-"Review analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch against legacy/$1. For each
+"Review analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch and
+analysis/$1/security_remediation.local.patch against legacy/$1. For each
 hunk: does it fully remediate the cited finding? Does it introduce new
-vulnerabilities or change behavior beyond the fix? Return one verdict per
+vulnerabilities or change behavior beyond the fix? Confirm no raw
-hunk: RESOLVES / PARTIAL / INTRODUCES-RISK, with a one-line reason."
+credential values appear anywhere in the shareable patch. Return one
+verdict per hunk: RESOLVES / PARTIAL / INTRODUCES-RISK, with a one-line
+reason."
 
 Add a **Patch Review** section to SECURITY_FINDINGS.md with the verdicts.
 If any hunk is PARTIAL or INTRODUCES-RISK, revise the patch and re-review.
@@ -57,8 +111,12 @@ If any hunk is PARTIAL or INTRODUCES-RISK, revise the patch and re-review.
 
 Tell the user the artifacts are ready:
 - `analysis/$1/SECURITY_FINDINGS.md` — findings, remediation log, patch review
-- `analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch` — review, then apply if appropriate
+- `analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch` — review, then apply **from the
-  with `git -C legacy/$1 apply ../../analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch`
+  project root**: `git apply analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch`
+  (if `legacy/$1` is a symlink, use `git apply --unsafe-paths` or apply
+  with `patch -p0` from the project root)
+- `analysis/$1/security_remediation.local.patch` — the credential fixes;
+  apply the same way, and rotate the affected credentials regardless
 - Re-run `/modernize-harden $1` after applying to confirm resolution
 
 Suggest: `glow -p analysis/$1/SECURITY_FINDINGS.md`