Legacy systems often contain live credentials, and assessment/findings
files get committed and shared. Previously the security-auditor agent
reported hardcoded secrets verbatim into ASSESSMENT.md and
SECURITY_FINDINGS.md.
- security-auditor: mandatory secret-handling rules — mask all credential
values (file:line + 2-4 char preview), redact secrets from echoed tool
output, recommend rotation for anything that looks live
- assess/harden: gitignore-verified SECRETS.local.md quarantine file for
the per-credential inventory; findings files get masked entries and a
pointer only
- new --show-secrets flag opts into raw values in the quarantine file
(and only there)
- README: document the behavior and advise users of earlier versions to
check for already-committed findings and rotate
- modernize-harden: never edits legacy/ anymore. Writes findings plus a
reviewed unified diff to analysis/<system>/security_remediation.patch.
A second security-auditor pass reviews each hunk (RESOLVES / PARTIAL /
INTRODUCES-RISK) before presenting. The user reviews and applies the
patch deliberately, then re-runs to verify. This makes every command
consistent with the recommended deny Edit(legacy/**) workspace setting,
so the README's exception note is gone.
- modernize-map: restructure the parse-target list around three stack-
agnostic principles (dispatcher targets are variables; code-storage
joins live in config; entry points live in deployment descriptors), with
COBOL/Java/web/CLI examples on equal footing rather than COBOL-dominant.
Same protections against false dead-code findings, less stack-specific.
- security-auditor agent: rephrase coverage items in stack-neutral terms
(record layouts/temp datasets, resource ACLs, deployment scripts/job
definitions, batch input records) so the checklist reads naturally for
COBOL, Java EE, .NET, and web targets alike.
- README: drop the harden exception note; describe the patch workflow.
