Mohamed Hegazy a67587c816
security-guidance: enable LLM review on default macOS Python 3.9
Fixes anthropics/claude-plugins-official#2071 — on macOS where the
default `python3` is Apple's Command Line Tools Python 3.9.6, the
plugin's agentic commit reviewer silently does not run, even when the
user has a newer Python installed.

Three compounding factors in the bug:

1. `sg-python.sh` only checks the major version (`3`), so it always
   picks 3.9 even when 3.10+ is on PATH.
2. `claude_agent_sdk` requires Python >=3.10 — pip install on 3.9
   returns "No matching distribution" -> bootstrap returns BUILD_FAILED.
3. Even with a hand-built 3.12 venv, `llm.py` imports the SDK
   in-process into the hook's interpreter (still 3.9), which raises
   SyntaxError. The existing venv-probe in `ensure_agent_sdk.py` uses
   the venv's own Python (3.12) so it reports NOOP_VENV (healthy) while
   the consumer fails — misleading telemetry on top of silent feature
   degradation.

Per BQ telemetry, 14,073 external macOS users hit
sdk_bootstrap=BUILD_FAILED in the past 4 days (the default-macOS
cohort), out of ~86K total external installed users. Combined with
~20K other users in similar broken-bootstrap states (Windows pre-#2055,
Linux <3.10), about half the installed base has a silently-broken
agentic reviewer.

This PR implements the reporter's items #1, #3, and #4. Item #2
(running the SDK out-of-process) is deferred as a bigger refactor.

Item #1 — hooks/sg-python.sh — prefer >=3.10 binaries via 3-pass probe:

  Pass 1: python3.13 / 3.12 / 3.11 / 3.10 (>=3.10 by name, highest wins)
  Pass 2: bare python3 / python / py -3 (accept only if reported >=3.10)
  Pass 3: bare python3 / python / py -3 (any Python 3, FALLBACK so
          pattern checks still work on macOS-default 3.9 — no regression
          vs today; SDK-dependent paths detect the version mismatch
          inside Python and degrade cleanly via item #4)

Item #4 — ensure_agent_sdk.py — health-check honesty:

Added HOOK_PY_INCOMPATIBLE=6 outcome with short-circuit at top of main():

  if sys.version_info < (3, 10):
      return HOOK_PY_INCOMPATIBLE, "hook_py", f"py_{...}"

Telemetry consequences after rollout: sdk_bootstrap=6 is a new clean
bucket; some users currently miscounted in sdk_bootstrap=3 BUILD_FAILED
(wasted pip cycles) and sdk_bootstrap=1 NOOP_VENV (falsely-healthy)
move to sdk_bootstrap=6. The remaining NOOP_VENV count becomes
trustworthy.

Item #3 — ensure_agent_sdk.py — one-time user-visible notice:

When outcome == HOOK_PY_INCOMPATIBLE and a marker file at
`~/.claude/security/.agentic_unavailable_notice_v<pv>` doesn't exist,
the SessionStart response includes hookSpecificOutput.additionalContext
+ systemMessage explaining the situation. Marker file is plugin-
version-keyed so a future fix (e.g. shipping out-of-process SDK) can
bump pv and re-notify users.

BUILD_FAILED is intentionally excluded from the notice — it covers
transient causes where a permanent banner would mislead.

Verified locally on macOS Python 3.13:
  - py_compile clean on both files.
  - Existing 45-test smoke + extensibility suite: 45/45 PASS in 2.50s.
  - Unit test of simulated 3.9 path: HOOK_PY_INCOMPATIBLE returned with
    correct phase/kind; notice shown on first call, suppressed on
    second, reshown on bumped pv; BUILD_FAILED correctly does NOT
    trigger notice.

NOT verified: actual Python 3.9 behavior end-to-end (would need a 3.9
install). Worth a follow-up smoke test in a 3.9 venv before next
release. The unit test simulating 3.9 covers the logic but not the
runtime invocation through the shim.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 22:58:01 -07:00
..
2026-05-26 14:06:52 -07:00

security-guidance

Security review for Claude-generated code. Three layers:

  1. Pattern warnings — instant regex-based reminders on Edit/Write for ~25 known-dangerous patterns (yaml.load, torch.load(weights_only=False), pickle.load on untrusted data, raw innerHTML, hardcoded secrets, etc.).
  2. LLM diff review — when Claude finishes a turn, the plugin sends the diff to a fast LLM call (Opus 4.7 by default) and feeds high-severity findings back to Claude so it can fix them before you see the response.
  3. Agentic commit review — on git commit, an SDK-driven reviewer reads related files (Read/Grep/Glob) to trace data flow across the codebase, catching multi-file vulnerabilities pattern matching misses (IDOR, auth bypass, cross-file SSRF).

Findings cover common web-vulnerability classes — injection, XSS, SSRF, hardcoded secrets, IDOR, auth bypass, unsafe deserialization, and path traversal among others.

Install

/plugin install security-guidance@claude-plugins-official

Marketplace ships enabled by default in Claude Code — no setup beyond having the CLI itself.

Prerequisites

  • Claude Code CLI ≥ v2.1.144
  • Python 3.8+ on PATH (python3, python, or py -3 — the plugin picks the first that works)
  • A working API path (subscription, API key, or 3P provider config)

Configuration

All configuration is via environment variables. None are required for default behavior.

Selecting a model

# 1P / gateway: a canonical model id
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=claude-opus-4-7   # default

# Bedrock: use the inference-profile id
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-7

# Vertex: use the Vertex date-tag form
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=claude-opus-4-7@20260218

SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL controls the LLM diff review. SG_AGENTIC_MODEL (same syntax) controls the agentic commit reviewer; defaults to the same model.

Enabling/disabling layers

Variable Default What it does
SECURITY_GUIDANCE_DISABLE=1 unset Kill switch — disables the entire plugin
ENABLE_PATTERN_RULES=0 on Disable layer 1 (regex pattern warnings)
ENABLE_CODE_SECURITY_REVIEW=0 on Disable all LLM reviews (Stop hook + commit/push)
ENABLE_STOP_REVIEW=0 on Disable only the Stop-hook diff review, keeping commit/push reviews. Useful for multi-agent / shared-worktree setups where another agent can move HEAD between a worker's turns
ENABLE_COMMIT_REVIEW=0 on Disable layer 3 (agentic commit review)

Higher-recall mode

SG_DUAL_OR=on   # default off

Runs two parallel review calls and unions the findings. Catches a few percentage points more vulnerabilities in our testing, at roughly 2× the API cost per review. Most users don't need it.

Org-specific policies

Drop a claude-security-guidance.md in any of:

  • ~/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md — user-wide rules
  • <project>/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md — project rules, intended to be committed
  • <project>/.claude/claude-security-guidance.local.md — local overrides, intended to be .gitignore'd

All three are loaded and concatenated into the LLM diff review's prompt in the order user → project → project-local. If the combined size exceeds the 8 KB prompt budget, the tail is truncated, so user-wide rules are kept and project-local rules are dropped first. The agentic commit reviewer (layer 3) does not currently read this file. Example:

# Acme security rules

- All SELECTs against the `customers` or `orders` tables MUST go through `db.replica`,
  never `db.primary`. Primary is for writes only.
- Background jobs must not use the user-context auth token; they get
  service-account creds from `jobs.get_service_account()`.
- Calls to `requests.get(url)` with a user-controlled `url` need
  the SSRF-allowlist wrapper at `acme.net.safe_request`.

Built-in rules cover common web-vulnerability classes without it — claude-security-guidance.md is for things specific to your codebase that the model can't infer.

Privacy and data handling

The plugin sends data to a model endpoint to perform its reviews. Specifically, each Stop-hook diff review transmits the changed file paths, the diff hunks, and the relevant file contents in the diff; each agentic commit review additionally transmits any files the reviewer pulls in via Read/Grep/Glob while tracing data flow. Your claude-security-guidance.md contents (user, project, and local) are appended to the prompt on every review, so don't put secrets in it.

Where that data goes depends on your Claude Code configuration:

  • Default (Anthropic API / subscription): sent to api.anthropic.com and handled under Anthropic's Commercial Terms and Privacy Policy.
  • LLM gateway (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set): sent to your gateway URL instead. The gateway operator's terms apply.
  • 3rd-party providers (Bedrock / Vertex / Foundry / Mantle): sent to your configured provider endpoint. The provider's data-handling terms apply (e.g., AWS / GCP / Azure).

The plugin writes its own debug log to ~/.claude/security/log.txt (override with SECURITY_GUIDANCE_DEBUG_LOG). The log contains diffstate metadata and finding categories — no full file contents or model prompts — and rotates at 1 MB. Nothing is uploaded.

Limitations

This is a best-effort assistive tool, not a guarantee. Treat findings as suggestions, not as a substitute for human code review, SAST/DAST, dependency scanning, or pen-testing. The reviewer can miss vulnerabilities, produce false positives, and may behave differently across codebases, languages, and model versions. No warranty is provided — use is subject to Anthropic's Commercial Terms.

Troubleshooting

Plugin doesn't seem to fire — check that ~/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md (or hook activity) shows in debug logs. Run Claude Code with --debug-file /tmp/claude/debug.txt and grep for security_reminder_hook. The plugin also writes its own log to ~/.claude/security/log.txt.

Review never finds anything — verify your API path works. On 3P providers, check SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL is set to a provider-specific id (not a bare claude-opus-4-7). On LLM gateways, check the gateway's logs for POST /v1/messages traffic from the plugin.

Too many false positives — drop SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL to a cheaper model (claude-sonnet-4-6) and re-evaluate; if precision is the priority, stay on Opus 4.7.

Want to silence a specific finding — add a comment to the line explaining why it's safe; the LLM reviewer treats inline justifications as exclusions. For systemic exclusions, document them in your claude-security-guidance.md.

Reporting issues

Open an issue on the security-guidance plugin repo with:

  • The Claude Code CLI version (claude --version)
  • Provider setup (1P / Bedrock / Vertex / LLM gateway / etc.)
  • A minimal repro diff
  • The relevant section of ~/.claude/security/log.txt