Mohamed Hegazy 84011d43b1
security-guidance: migrate from deprecated output_format to output_config.format (#2098)
Fixes #2098. The Anthropic Messages API moved structured-output
schema specification from a top-level `output_format` field to a
nested `output_config.format` field, per
https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/build-with-claude/structured-outputs.

Per docs the old form "will continue working for a transition period"
— and indeed for api-key + non-streaming auth it still returns HTTP
200 (verified via live API). But OAuth Bearer users with CLI 2.1.158
hit `invalid_request_error: output_format: This field is deprecated.
Use 'output_config.format' instead.` consistently — reporter saw 462
errors in one day. The trigger appears to be auth mode + possibly
stream:true (their controlled curl bypass used Bearer + stream=true);
api-key + non-streaming was my initial repro attempt and didn't fire.

The bug only affected `_call_claude` (the legacy direct-urllib path).
The agentic `_agentic_review` path goes through claude_agent_sdk →
subprocesses to the `claude` CLI binary, which already uses the new
`output_config.format` shape correctly (per src/utils/sideQuery.ts:263
in claude-cli-internal). So this PR only needs to fix the plugin's
direct HTTP path.

This commit:

1. llm.py: rewrite the payload literal in `_call_claude` to use
   `output_config: { format: { type: 'json_schema', schema: ... } }`
   instead of top-level `output_format`.

2. llm.py: in the adaptive-thinking branch, MERGE `effort: "high"`
   into the existing `output_config` dict instead of reassigning.
   Reassignment would silently clobber the format schema set in (1).
   The pre-existing code did `payload["output_config"] = {"effort":
   "high"}` which was correct WHEN output_format was top-level (and
   output_config wasn't otherwise used). With the migration the
   existing dict carries the schema, so we extend it not replace it.

Verified locally on macOS Python 3.13:

  - py_compile clean.
  - Existing 401 tests still pass — 0 regression.
  - 6 new tests in test_2098_output_config_format.py (added to
    internal test suite at sg-staging/tests/, not in this PR):

      * 2 static-shape: the `_call_claude` source no longer contains
        top-level `"output_format":` AND uses `output_config`. The
        adaptive-thinking branch does NOT reassign output_config (and
        DOES set output_config['effort']). Catches the regression
        class where a future refactor reintroduces either bug.
      * 2 payload-shape unit (mocked urllib): both thinking_budget=0
        and thinking_budget>0+adaptive code paths produce a payload
        with the correct `output_config.format` shape AND no
        `output_format` top-level. The adaptive path verifies both
        `format` and `effort` coexist in output_config (i.e., the
        merge fix works).
      * 2 live-API gating (skip-on-no-key): the new shape returns
        HTTP 200 against api.anthropic.com; the old shape's current
        status is recorded for canary purposes (still 200 for
        api-key today, but reporter shows it's 400 for OAuth).

  - Full suite: 405/405 pass + 2 skipped (live API tests, opt-in).
  - The reporter's exact deprecation 400 message reproduces if you
    swap auth to OAuth Bearer + stream:true (could not test locally
    without extracting the keychain OAuth token, which was out of
    scope). The fix shape is API-contract-level so it doesn't depend
    on which auth mode triggers the 400.

NOT verified end-to-end via OAuth-authenticated plugin invocation on
my machine (auto-mode classifier correctly declined to extract the
keychain token). Reporter's 462 production errors + the docs
migration notice + the live-API HTTP 200 on the new form are
sufficient evidence to ship.

Closes #2098.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-30 20:11:41 -07:00
..
2026-05-26 14:06:52 -07:00

security-guidance

Security review for Claude-generated code. Three layers:

  1. Pattern warnings — instant regex-based reminders on Edit/Write for ~25 known-dangerous patterns (yaml.load, torch.load(weights_only=False), pickle.load on untrusted data, raw innerHTML, hardcoded secrets, etc.).
  2. LLM diff review — when Claude finishes a turn, the plugin sends the diff to a fast LLM call (Opus 4.7 by default) and feeds high-severity findings back to Claude so it can fix them before you see the response.
  3. Agentic commit review — on git commit, an SDK-driven reviewer reads related files (Read/Grep/Glob) to trace data flow across the codebase, catching multi-file vulnerabilities pattern matching misses (IDOR, auth bypass, cross-file SSRF).

Findings cover common web-vulnerability classes — injection, XSS, SSRF, hardcoded secrets, IDOR, auth bypass, unsafe deserialization, and path traversal among others.

Install

/plugin install security-guidance@claude-plugins-official

Marketplace ships enabled by default in Claude Code — no setup beyond having the CLI itself.

Prerequisites

  • Claude Code CLI ≥ v2.1.144
  • Python 3.8+ on PATH (python3, python, or py -3 — the plugin picks the first that works)
  • A working API path (subscription, API key, or 3P provider config)

Configuration

All configuration is via environment variables. None are required for default behavior.

Selecting a model

# 1P / gateway: a canonical model id
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=claude-opus-4-7   # default

# Bedrock: use the inference-profile id
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-7

# Vertex: use the Vertex date-tag form
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=claude-opus-4-7@20260218

SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL controls the LLM diff review. SG_AGENTIC_MODEL (same syntax) controls the agentic commit reviewer; defaults to the same model.

Enabling/disabling layers

Variable Default What it does
SECURITY_GUIDANCE_DISABLE=1 unset Kill switch — disables the entire plugin
ENABLE_PATTERN_RULES=0 on Disable layer 1 (regex pattern warnings)
ENABLE_CODE_SECURITY_REVIEW=0 on Disable all LLM reviews (Stop hook + commit/push)
ENABLE_STOP_REVIEW=0 on Disable only the Stop-hook diff review, keeping commit/push reviews. Useful for multi-agent / shared-worktree setups where another agent can move HEAD between a worker's turns
ENABLE_COMMIT_REVIEW=0 on Disable layer 3 (agentic commit review)

Higher-recall mode

SG_DUAL_OR=on   # default off

Runs two parallel review calls and unions the findings. Catches a few percentage points more vulnerabilities in our testing, at roughly 2× the API cost per review. Most users don't need it.

Org-specific policies

Drop a claude-security-guidance.md in any of:

  • ~/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md — user-wide rules
  • <project>/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md — project rules, intended to be committed
  • <project>/.claude/claude-security-guidance.local.md — local overrides, intended to be .gitignore'd

All three are loaded and concatenated into the LLM diff review's prompt in the order user → project → project-local. If the combined size exceeds the 8 KB prompt budget, the tail is truncated, so user-wide rules are kept and project-local rules are dropped first. The agentic commit reviewer (layer 3) does not currently read this file. Example:

# Acme security rules

- All SELECTs against the `customers` or `orders` tables MUST go through `db.replica`,
  never `db.primary`. Primary is for writes only.
- Background jobs must not use the user-context auth token; they get
  service-account creds from `jobs.get_service_account()`.
- Calls to `requests.get(url)` with a user-controlled `url` need
  the SSRF-allowlist wrapper at `acme.net.safe_request`.

Built-in rules cover common web-vulnerability classes without it — claude-security-guidance.md is for things specific to your codebase that the model can't infer.

Privacy and data handling

The plugin sends data to a model endpoint to perform its reviews. Specifically, each Stop-hook diff review transmits the changed file paths, the diff hunks, and the relevant file contents in the diff; each agentic commit review additionally transmits any files the reviewer pulls in via Read/Grep/Glob while tracing data flow. Your claude-security-guidance.md contents (user, project, and local) are appended to the prompt on every review, so don't put secrets in it.

Where that data goes depends on your Claude Code configuration:

  • Default (Anthropic API / subscription): sent to api.anthropic.com and handled under Anthropic's Commercial Terms and Privacy Policy.
  • LLM gateway (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL set): sent to your gateway URL instead. The gateway operator's terms apply.
  • 3rd-party providers (Bedrock / Vertex / Foundry / Mantle): sent to your configured provider endpoint. The provider's data-handling terms apply (e.g., AWS / GCP / Azure).

The plugin writes its own debug log to ~/.claude/security/log.txt (override with SECURITY_GUIDANCE_DEBUG_LOG). The log contains diffstate metadata and finding categories — no full file contents or model prompts — and rotates at 1 MB. Nothing is uploaded.

Limitations

This is a best-effort assistive tool, not a guarantee. Treat findings as suggestions, not as a substitute for human code review, SAST/DAST, dependency scanning, or pen-testing. The reviewer can miss vulnerabilities, produce false positives, and may behave differently across codebases, languages, and model versions. No warranty is provided — use is subject to Anthropic's Commercial Terms.

Troubleshooting

Plugin doesn't seem to fire — check that ~/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md (or hook activity) shows in debug logs. Run Claude Code with --debug-file /tmp/claude/debug.txt and grep for security_reminder_hook. The plugin also writes its own log to ~/.claude/security/log.txt.

Review never finds anything — verify your API path works. On 3P providers, check SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL is set to a provider-specific id (not a bare claude-opus-4-7). On LLM gateways, check the gateway's logs for POST /v1/messages traffic from the plugin.

Too many false positives — drop SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL to a cheaper model (claude-sonnet-4-6) and re-evaluate; if precision is the priority, stay on Opus 4.7.

Want to silence a specific finding — add a comment to the line explaining why it's safe; the LLM reviewer treats inline justifications as exclusions. For systemic exclusions, document them in your claude-security-guidance.md.

Reporting issues

Open an issue on the security-guidance plugin repo with:

  • The Claude Code CLI version (claude --version)
  • Provider setup (1P / Bedrock / Vertex / LLM gateway / etc.)
  • A minimal repro diff
  • The relevant section of ~/.claude/security/log.txt