a40c9f1e83
Followup to PR #2086 (which added the flag to 4 specific git call sites) and PR #2100 (text=True purge for #2099). The Windows reporter for #2099 noticed more git invocations still lacked the flag — rev-parse path queries (--show-toplevel, --git-dir, --git-common-dir), reflog %gs subjects, and `git show <sha>:<path>` all output paths but the per-site PR #2086 approach missed them. The result: an Arabic-named directory shows up via _git_diff_range but rev-parse-emitted paths get C-quoted, breaking downstream os.path.isabs() checks. Fix: add `-c core.quotePath=false` to GIT_CMD itself as the 4th config-set. Every subprocess.run using the *GIT_CMD splat picks it up automatically — diff feeders, rev-parse path queries, reflog log, ls-files, status, git show. No more per-site flag duplication. This commit: 1. gitutil.py: add -c core.quotePath=false to GIT_CMD. 2. Remove the now-redundant per-site flags at the 7 call sites that previously had inline -c core.quotePath=false (cleanup, since the global setting subsumes them): gitutil.py: _git_diff_range, _git_name_only, _git_status_porcelain, get_git_diff (4 sites) diffstate.py: _list_untracked git ls-files (1 site) security_reminder_hook.py: commit-review git diff + git show (2 sites) Verified locally on latest main (post PR #2100 merge) with macOS Python 3.13: - py_compile clean on all 3 modified files. - Bare main BEFORE my fix: 400/401 pass — 1 failure proves the gap (test_git_cmd_contains_quotepath_false catches the missing flag). - Main + my fix: 401/401 pass. - 23 new tests in test_quotepath_global.py (added to internal test suite at sg-staging/tests/, not in this PR): * 1 GIT_CMD-level: GIT_CMD list contains core.quotePath=false as a (-c, value) pair. Single source of truth — single place a future PR will be caught if the flag gets dropped. * 10 static-shape (one per hooks/*.py): every subprocess.run uses the *GIT_CMD splat (no bare git invocation that would bypass the global flag). * 12 end-to-end (parametrized over Arabic, Hebrew, CJK directory names): real git repo, _git_diff_range emits unquoted diff, extract_file_paths_from_diff and parse_diff_into_files keep the non-ASCII path in their output, _git_toplevel returns the non-ASCII path intact. - 1 staleness fix in test_diff_parser_non_ascii.py (test_no_bare_git_diff_or_show_without_flag): updated to accept EITHER inline core.quotePath=false OR *GIT_CMD splat (which globally provides it). NOT verified end-to-end on Windows with a non-ASCII repo root path. The new global-flag test pins the contract permanently, and the parametrized macOS tests confirm parser behavior on ASCII-control paths in non-ASCII directories. The Windows-specific rev-parse quoting behavior follows from the same git contract our macOS test environment exercises (POSIX git always emits raw UTF-8 regardless of quotePath; on Windows the flag is what makes output raw). Closes the #2099 followup specifically about _git_diff_range / rev-parse --show-toplevel / git log %gs paths slipping past. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
security-guidance
Security review for Claude-generated code. Three layers:
- Pattern warnings — instant regex-based reminders on
Edit/Writefor ~25 known-dangerous patterns (yaml.load,torch.load(weights_only=False),pickle.loadon untrusted data, rawinnerHTML, hardcoded secrets, etc.). - LLM diff review — when Claude finishes a turn, the plugin sends the diff to a fast LLM call (Opus 4.7 by default) and feeds high-severity findings back to Claude so it can fix them before you see the response.
- Agentic commit review — on
git commit, an SDK-driven reviewer reads related files (Read/Grep/Glob) to trace data flow across the codebase, catching multi-file vulnerabilities pattern matching misses (IDOR, auth bypass, cross-file SSRF).
Findings cover common web-vulnerability classes — injection, XSS, SSRF, hardcoded secrets, IDOR, auth bypass, unsafe deserialization, and path traversal among others.
Install
/plugin install security-guidance@claude-plugins-official
Marketplace ships enabled by default in Claude Code — no setup beyond having the CLI itself.
Prerequisites
- Claude Code CLI ≥ v2.1.144
- Python 3.8+ on
PATH(python3,python, orpy -3— the plugin picks the first that works) - A working API path (subscription, API key, or 3P provider config)
Configuration
All configuration is via environment variables. None are required for default behavior.
Selecting a model
# 1P / gateway: a canonical model id
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=claude-opus-4-7 # default
# Bedrock: use the inference-profile id
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-7
# Vertex: use the Vertex date-tag form
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL=claude-opus-4-7@20260218
SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL controls the LLM diff review. SG_AGENTIC_MODEL (same syntax) controls the agentic commit reviewer; defaults to the same model.
Enabling/disabling layers
| Variable | Default | What it does |
|---|---|---|
SECURITY_GUIDANCE_DISABLE=1 |
unset | Kill switch — disables the entire plugin |
ENABLE_PATTERN_RULES=0 |
on | Disable layer 1 (regex pattern warnings) |
ENABLE_CODE_SECURITY_REVIEW=0 |
on | Disable all LLM reviews (Stop hook + commit/push) |
ENABLE_STOP_REVIEW=0 |
on | Disable only the Stop-hook diff review, keeping commit/push reviews. Useful for multi-agent / shared-worktree setups where another agent can move HEAD between a worker's turns |
ENABLE_COMMIT_REVIEW=0 |
on | Disable layer 3 (agentic commit review) |
Higher-recall mode
SG_DUAL_OR=on # default off
Runs two parallel review calls and unions the findings. Catches a few percentage points more vulnerabilities in our testing, at roughly 2× the API cost per review. Most users don't need it.
Org-specific policies
Drop a claude-security-guidance.md in any of:
~/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md— user-wide rules<project>/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md— project rules, intended to be committed<project>/.claude/claude-security-guidance.local.md— local overrides, intended to be.gitignore'd
All three are loaded and concatenated into the LLM diff review's prompt in the order user → project → project-local. If the combined size exceeds the 8 KB prompt budget, the tail is truncated, so user-wide rules are kept and project-local rules are dropped first. The agentic commit reviewer (layer 3) does not currently read this file. Example:
# Acme security rules
- All SELECTs against the `customers` or `orders` tables MUST go through `db.replica`,
never `db.primary`. Primary is for writes only.
- Background jobs must not use the user-context auth token; they get
service-account creds from `jobs.get_service_account()`.
- Calls to `requests.get(url)` with a user-controlled `url` need
the SSRF-allowlist wrapper at `acme.net.safe_request`.
Built-in rules cover common web-vulnerability classes without it — claude-security-guidance.md is for things specific to your codebase that the model can't infer.
Privacy and data handling
The plugin sends data to a model endpoint to perform its reviews. Specifically, each Stop-hook diff review transmits the changed file paths, the diff hunks, and the relevant file contents in the diff; each agentic commit review additionally transmits any files the reviewer pulls in via Read/Grep/Glob while tracing data flow. Your claude-security-guidance.md contents (user, project, and local) are appended to the prompt on every review, so don't put secrets in it.
Where that data goes depends on your Claude Code configuration:
- Default (Anthropic API / subscription): sent to
api.anthropic.comand handled under Anthropic's Commercial Terms and Privacy Policy. - LLM gateway (
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URLset): sent to your gateway URL instead. The gateway operator's terms apply. - 3rd-party providers (Bedrock / Vertex / Foundry / Mantle): sent to your configured provider endpoint. The provider's data-handling terms apply (e.g., AWS / GCP / Azure).
The plugin writes its own debug log to ~/.claude/security/log.txt (override with SECURITY_GUIDANCE_DEBUG_LOG). The log contains diffstate metadata and finding categories — no full file contents or model prompts — and rotates at 1 MB. Nothing is uploaded.
Limitations
This is a best-effort assistive tool, not a guarantee. Treat findings as suggestions, not as a substitute for human code review, SAST/DAST, dependency scanning, or pen-testing. The reviewer can miss vulnerabilities, produce false positives, and may behave differently across codebases, languages, and model versions. No warranty is provided — use is subject to Anthropic's Commercial Terms.
Troubleshooting
Plugin doesn't seem to fire — check that ~/.claude/claude-security-guidance.md (or hook activity) shows in debug logs. Run Claude Code with --debug-file /tmp/claude/debug.txt and grep for security_reminder_hook. The plugin also writes its own log to ~/.claude/security/log.txt.
Review never finds anything — verify your API path works. On 3P providers, check SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL is set to a provider-specific id (not a bare claude-opus-4-7). On LLM gateways, check the gateway's logs for POST /v1/messages traffic from the plugin.
Too many false positives — drop SECURITY_REVIEW_MODEL to a cheaper model (claude-sonnet-4-6) and re-evaluate; if precision is the priority, stay on Opus 4.7.
Want to silence a specific finding — add a comment to the line explaining why it's safe; the LLM reviewer treats inline justifications as exclusions. For systemic exclusions, document them in your claude-security-guidance.md.
Reporting issues
Open an issue on the security-guidance plugin repo with:
- The Claude Code CLI version (
claude --version) - Provider setup (1P / Bedrock / Vertex / LLM gateway / etc.)
- A minimal repro diff
- The relevant section of
~/.claude/security/log.txt