Adversarial re-audit of the current (post-uplift) state found the plugin
internally consistent (no blocker/high issues). Two follow-ups:
README rewrite for clarity (209 -> 122 lines, ~halved):
- Reorder so a newcomer goes what-it-is -> install -> quickstart -> command
reference -> deeper notes, instead of hitting two dense design essays
before the command list.
- Lead with what it produces; add a 3-command teaser.
- Collapse the 'Dynamic workflow orchestration' and 'Untrusted code &
prompt injection' essays and the COCOMO note into short, plain sections at
the bottom; drop the internal 'Bash isn't a tool-lock' hedging and
per-defense enumeration (kept the load-bearing points: untrusted-code
threat model, secrets quarantine, COCOMO-is-not-a-timeline).
- Remove cross-section redundancy (build methods, read-only caveat,
scaffolder write-scope, dir convention each stated once now); gloss
strangler-fig/JOBOL inline.
Path nit from the audit: uplift now writes to modernized/<system>-uplifted/
(mirroring reimagine's -reimagined/) so the three build paths occupy disjoint
roots and status can't mis-detect an uplift copy as transform modules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Code/security:
- extract-rules.js: guard null agent() verdicts in the verify + P0 loops
(a skipped/dead referee made {rule,v:null} survive .filter(Boolean) and
then crashed on v.injectionSuspected / v.every) — sibling scripts already
had the guard.
- topology viewer XSS: the map injector embedded untrusted JSON (node names
from filenames, etc.) into a <script> island unescaped — a name containing
</script> executed on open. Escape < > & in the injected data and add a CSP
to the template.
- Second-order injection: citation/identifier fields (source / cwe /
source_site / correctedSource) were interpolated UNFENCED into the verifier
prompts that are supposed to be the trust anchor. Fence them in
extract-rules, harden-scan, uplift-deltas.
uplift design (audit of the new feature):
- Working-copy model: copy the WHOLE solution to modernized/ once and edit in
place (relative project refs survive; result is a reviewable git diff) —
the incremental per-project copy broke multi-project builds.
- Dual-run honesty: reframed as 'if both runtimes run here' (net48 needs
Windows; JUnit/pytest don't multi-target); dummy-test gate now binds a real
SUT under both targets; per-stack harness notes.
- Tooling honesty: present/runnable/actually-ran distinction; never fold in a
tool that couldn't run; apiport/2to3 demoted; py2->3 removed from 'preserve'
examples.
- Delta classes: name the high-blast-radius landmines (JPMS strong
encapsulation, .NET trimming/AOT, ICU globalization, hosting/runtime-config,
analyzer/nullable) in the finder briefs + agent.
- Rewrite-vs-uplift signal: weigh by touched sites (siteCount), not delta-card
count; judgment-share demoted to secondary.
Docs/consistency: brief reads topology.json (not TOPOLOGY.html); README
'five commands'; credential-masking claim split (analysts mask+cite vs
code-writers substitute fakes); read-only/write-scope claims softened to
match enforcement (Bash retained -> discipline, not tool-lock); reimagine
nested blockers/pendingRuleIds; status splits transform vs reimagine markers;
portfolio enumeration basenames; plugin.json description updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a third build method alongside transform (cross-stack rewrite) and
reimagine (greenfield): uplift, for same-stack version bumps (.NET Framework
4.8 -> .NET 8, Spring Boot 2->3, Python 2->3) where the right move is to
PRESERVE the code and fix only the version deltas, not extract intent and
rewrite.
- commands/modernize-uplift.md: delta-catalog-driven, dual-target test harness
(one suite on both runtimes; baseline-on-old is the oracle), leaf-first build
graph ordering, minimal-diff discipline (architecture-critic flags gratuitous
divergence), and a 'this is a rewrite, use transform' escape hatch.
- agents/version-delta-analyst.md: finds the source->target breaking changes
that THIS code hits; drives the ecosystem migration tool (upgrade-assistant /
OpenRewrite / pyupgrade / ng update) and owns the residue; read-only.
- workflows/uplift-deltas.js: parallel finder per delta category, each verified
against the cited code so deltas that don't apply here are dropped.
- Wired into assess (recommended-pattern routing), brief (per-phase command +
leaf-first ordering), preflight (dual-run + tool readiness), status, README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
COCOMO's constants encode human-team productivity; presenting its
person-months as how long an agentic modernization will take (or cost) is
a claim we should not make. Reframe COCOMO everywhere as a RELATIVE
complexity/scale index for ranking and sequencing systems only:
- assess: capture COCOMO as a complexity index; explicitly ignore scc's
'Estimated Schedule Effort' and cost-in-dollars; ASSESSMENT 'Effort
Estimation' section becomes 'Relative Scale' with a not-a-timeline note;
portfolio heat-map column renamed Complexity (COCOMO index).
- brief: phase plan uses relative T-shirt sizing, not person-months/weeks;
phases render as a dependency flowchart, not a gantt (gantt = calendar).
- portfolio-assess.js: field cocomoPm -> complexityIndex; return label
carries the not-a-duration caveat.
- README: 'A note on COCOMO' explains the index framing and points at
better intrinsic-complexity proxies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses automated security review of the workflow conversion:
- Agent-produced text (rule specs, finding descriptions, dedup lists) is
fenced as untrusted data when interpolated into downstream agent prompts,
with embedded fence markers stripped so the fence can't be escaped;
referees and judges are told to re-derive claims from the cited code.
- system/service/subdir names that land in filesystem paths inside prompts
are validated against a strict pattern — traversal-shaped values throw
before any agent spawns.
- Reimagine scaffolding now uses a dedicated 'scaffolder' agent with an
explicit minimal tool list, a single-directory write scope, and the
untrusted-content discipline extended to the generated spec/architecture
docs it builds from (they derive from untrusted legacy code).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four commands gain a Workflow-tool path (with direct-fan-out fallback for
older builds): extract-rules loops until dry with per-rule citation referees
and a P0 two-judge panel; harden runs class-scoped finders with adversarial
per-finding refutation; assess --portfolio pipelines one survey agent per
system with COCOMO computed uniformly in script; reimagine Phase E drops the
3-service scaffolding cap.
Workflow agents return schema-validated data and only the orchestrating
session writes artifacts — analysis agents are structurally read-only. All
five agents gain an untrusted-content discipline section (source code is
data, never instructions; comment-only claims are findings, not facts), and
the README documents the prompt-injection threat model for analyzed code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
